Privacy-preserving data analysis is a rising challenge in contemporary statistics, as the privacy guarantees of statistical methods are often achieved at the expense of accuracy. In this paper, we investigate the tradeoff between statistical accuracy and privacy in mean estimation and linear regression, under both the classical lowdimensional and modern high-dimensional settings. A primary focus is to establish minimax optimality for statistical estimation with the (ε, δ)-differential privacy constraint. To this end, we find that classical lower bound arguments fail to yield sharp results, and new technical tools are called for.
1. Introduction. With the unprecedented availability of datasets containing sensitive personal information, there are increasing concerns that statistical analysis of such datasets may compromise individual privacy. These concerns give rise to statistical methods that provide privacy guarantees at the cost of statistical accuracy, but there has been very limited understanding of the optimal tradeoff between statistical accuracy and privacy cost.
A rigorous definition of privacy is a prerequisite for such an understanding. Differential privacy, introduced in Dwork et al. [15] , is arguably the most widely adopted definition of privacy in statistical data analysis. The promise of a differentially private algorithm is protection of any individual's privacy from an adversary who has access to the algorithm output and even sometimes the rest of the data.
Differential privacy has gained significant attention in the machine learning communities over the past few years [16, 1, 19, 13] and found its way into real world applications developed by Google [21] , Apple [9] , Microsoft [10] , and the U.S. Census Bureau [2] .
A usual approach to developing differentially private algorithms is perturbing the output of non-private algorithms by random noise. When the observations are continuous, differential privacy can be guaranteed by adding Laplace/Gaussian noise to the non-private output [16] . For discrete data, differential privacy can be achieved by adding Gumbel noise to utility score functions (also known as the exponential mechanism). Naturally, the processed output suffers from some loss of accuracy, which has been observed and studied in the literature, see, for example, Wasserman and Zhou [39] , Smith [32] , Lei [25] , Bassily et al. [5] , Dwork et al. [17] . However, given a certain privacy constraint, it is still unclear what the best achievable statistical accuracy is, or in other words, what the optimal tradeoff between privacy cost and statistical accuracy is.
The goal of this paper is to provide a quantitative characterization of the tradeoff between privacy cost and statistical accuracy, under the statistical minimax framework. Specifically, we consider this problem for mean estimation and linear regression models in both classical and high-dimensional settings with (ε, δ)-differential privacy constraint, which is formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [15] ). A randomized algorithm M is (ε, δ)-differentially private if and only if for every pair of adjacent datasets X 1:n and X 1:n , and for any set S, P(M (X 1:n ) ∈ S) ≤ e ε · P(M (X 1:n ) ∈ S) + δ, where we say two datasets X 1:n = {x i } n i=1 and X 1:n = {x i } n i=1 are adjacent if and only if n i=1 1(x i = x i ) = 1.
According to the definition, the two parameters ε and δ control the level of privacy against an adversary who attempts to detect the presence of a certain subject in the sample. Roughly speaking, ε is an upper bound on the amount of influence an individual's record has on the information released and δ is the probability that this bound fails to hold, so the privacy constraint becomes more stringent as ε, δ tend to 0.
We establish the necessary cost of privacy by first providing minimax lower bounds for the estimation accuracy under this (ε, δ)-differential privacy constraint. The results show that the estimators with privacy guarantees generally exhibit very different rates of convergence compared to their non-private counterparts. As a first example, we consider the d-dimensional mean estimation under the 2 loss: Theorem 2.2 in Section 2 shows that, when the sample size is n, for any (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm, in addition to the standard d/n statistical error, there must be an extra error of at least the order of d log(1/δ)/nε. This lower bound is established by using a general technique presented in Theorem 2.1, which reduces the establishing minimax risk lower bounds to designing and analyzing a tracing adversary that aims to detect the presence of an individual in a dataset via the output of a differentially private procedure that is applied to the dataset. The design and analysis of tracing adversary makes use of a novel generalization of the fingerprinting lemma, a concept from cryptography [6] . The connections between tracing adversaries, the fingerprinting lemma and differential privacy have been observed in [35] , [7] and [18] , but their discussions are primarily concerned with discrete distributions. In this paper, we provide a continuous version of the fingerprinting lemma that enables us to establish minimax lower bounds for a greater variety of statistical problems; more discussions are given in Section 2 as well as the Supplementary Material [8] .
Further, we argue that these necessary costs of privacy, as shown by lower bounds for the minimax rates, are in fact sharp in both mean estimation and linear regression problems. We construct efficient algorithms and establish matching upper bounds up to logarithmic factors. These algorithms are based on several differentially private subroutines, such as the Gaussian mechanism, reporting noisy top-k, and their modifications. In particular, for the high-dimensional linear regression, we propose a novel private iterative hard thresholding pursuit algorithm, based on a privately truncated version of stochastic gradient descent. Such a private truncation step effectively enforces the sparsity of the resulting estimator and leads to optimal control of the privacy cost (see more details in Section 4.2). To the best of our knowledge, these algorithms are the first results achieving the minimax optimal rates of convergence in high-dimensional statistical estimation problems with the (ε, δ)-differential privacy guarantee. Our Theorems 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, and 4.3 together provide matching upper and lower bounds for both mean estimation and linear regression problems in high-dimensional and classical settings, up to logarithmic factors.
Related literature. There are previous works studying how the privacy constraints compromise estimation accuracy. In theoretical computer science, Smith [32] showed that under strong conditions on privacy parameters, some point estimators attain the statistical convergence rates and hence privacy can be gained for free. [5, 17, 34] proposed differentially private algorithms for convex empirical risk minimization, principal component analysis, and high-dimensional regression, and investigated the convergence rates of excess risk. In addition, [7, 36, 3] considered the optimal estimation of sample quantities such as k-way marginals and top-k selection with privacy constrain. Unlike most prior works that focused on excess risks or the release of sample quantities, our focus is the population parameter estimation. Theoretical properties of excess risks or sample quantities can be very different from those of population parameters; see more discussions in [11] .
More recent works aimed to study differential privacy in the context of statistical estimation. [39] observed that, (ε, δ)-local differentially private schemes seem to yield slower convergence rates than the optimal minimax rates in general; [12] developed a framework for statistical minimax rates with the α-local privacy constraint; in addition, Rohde and Steinberger [31] showed minimax optimal rates of convergence under α-local differential privacy and exhibited a mechanism that is minimax optimal for nearly linear functionals based on randomized response. However, α-local privacy is a much stronger notion of privacy than (ε, δ)-differential privacy that is hardly compatible with high-dimensional problems [12] . As we shall see in this paper, the cost of (ε, δ)-differential privacy in statistical estimation behaves quite differently compared to that of α-local privacy.
Organization of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a general technical tool for deriving lower bounds of the minimax risk with differential privacy constraint. The new technical tool is then applied in Section 3 to the high-dimensional mean estimation problem. Both minimax lower bound results and algorithms with matching upper bounds are obtained. Section 4 further applies the general lower bound technique to investigate the minimax lower bounds of the linear regression problem with differential privacy constraint, in both low-dimensional and high-dimensional settings. The upper bounds are also obtained by providing novel differentially private algorithms and analyzing their risks. The results together show that our bounds are rate-optimal up to logarithmic factors. Simulation studies are carried out in Section 5 to show the advantages of our proposed algorithms. Section 6 applies our algorithms to real data sets with potentially sensitive information that warrants privacy-preserving methods. Section 7 discusses extensions to other statistical estimation problems with privacy constraints. The proofs are given in Section 8.
Definitions and notation. We conclude this section by introducing notations that will be used in the rest of the paper. For a positive integer n,
|x j | to denote the usual vector 0 , p and ∞ norm, respectively, where the 0 norm counts the number of nonzero entries in a vector. For any set A ⊆ [d] and v ∈ R d , let v A denote the |A|-dimensional vector consisting of v i such that i ∈ A. The Frobenius norm of a matrix Ω = (ω ij ) is denoted by Ω F = i,j ω 2 ij , and the spectral norm of Ω is Ω 2 . In addition, we use λ min , λ max to denote the smallest and the largest eigenvalues of Ω. The matrix 0 norm is defined similarly as the vector 0 norm, i.e. Ω 0 = #{(i, j) : ω ij = 0}. In addition, |Ω| denotes the determinant of Ω. The empirical measure is denoted by E n = n −1 n i=1 δ x i for a sample x 1 , . . . , x n . For a set A, we use A c to denote its complement, and 1(A) denotes the indicator function on A. We use C, C 1 , C 2 , ..., and c 1 , c 2 , ... to denote generic constants which may vary line by line.
A General Lower Bound for Minimax Risk with Differential
Privacy. This section presents a general minimax lower bound technique for statistical estimation problems with differential privacy constraint. As an application, we use this technique to establish a tight lower bound for differentially private mean estimation in this section.
Our lower bound technique is based on a tracing adversary that attempts to detect the presence of an individual data entry in a data set with the knowledge of an estimator computed from the data set. If one can construct a tracing adversary that is effective at this task given an accurate estimator, an argument by contradiction leads to a lower bound of the accuracy of differentially private estimators: suppose a differentially private estimator from a data set is sufficiently accurate, the tracing adversary will be able to determine the presence of an individual data entry in the data set, thus contradicting with the differential privacy guarantee. In other words, the privacy guarantee and the tracing adversary together ensure that a differentially private estimator cannot be "too accurate".
2.1.
Background and problem formulation. Let P denote a family of distributions supported on a set X , and let θ : P → Θ ⊂ R d denote a population quantity of interest. The statistician has access to a data set of n i.i.d. samples, X = (x 1 , ..., x n ) ∈ X n , drawn from a statistical model P ∈ P.
With the data, our goal is to estimate a population parameter θ(P ) by an estimator M (X) : X n → Θ that belongs to M ε,δ , the collection of all (ε, δ)-differentially private procedures. The performance of M (X) is measured by its distance to the truth θ(P ): formally, let ρ : Θ × Θ → R + be a metric induced by a norm · on Θ, namely ρ(θ 1 , θ 2 ) = θ 1 − θ 2 , and let l : R + → R + be a loss function that is monotonically increasing on R + , this paper studies the minimax risk for differentially-private estimation of the population parameter θ(P ):
In this paper, our setting of the privacy parameters are ε = O(1) and δ = o(1/n). This is essentially the most-permissive setting under which (ε, δ)-differential privacy is a nontrivial guarantee: [33] shows that δ < 1/n is essentially the weakest privacy guarantee that is still meaningful.
2.2.
Lower bound by tracing. Consider a tracing adversary A P (x, M (X)) : X × Θ → {IN, OUT} that outputs IN if it determines a certain sample x is in the data set X after seeing M (X), and outputs OUT otherwise. We define T R(X, M (X)) := {i ∈ [n] : A P (x i , M (X)) = IN}, the index set of samples that are determined as IN by the adversary A P . A survey of tracing adversaries and their relationship with differential privacy can be found in [19] and the reference therein.
Our general lower bound technique requires some regularity conditions for P and θ : P → Θ ⊂ R d : for every P ∈ P, we assume that there exists a P 0 ∈ P such that for every α ∈ [0, 1], (1 − α)P 0 + αP ∈ P, and θ ((1 − α)P 0 + αP ) = αθ(P ). The two statistical problems investigated in this paper, mean estimation and linear regression, satisfy the property.
The following theorem shows that minimax lower bounds for statistical estimation problems with privacy constraint can be constructed if there exist effective tracing adversaries:
Theorem 2.1. Suppose X = {x 1 , ..., x n } is an i.i.d. sample from a distribution P ∈ P, and assume that P and θ satisfy the regularity conditions described above. Given a tracing adversary A P (x, M (X)) that satisfies the following two properties when n ψ(P, δ),
where X i is an adjacent dataset of X with x i replaced by x i ∼ P , then if ε = O(1), n −1 e −3εn/2 ≤ δ ≤ n −(1+τ ) for some τ > 0, and n ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε, we have
Completeness and soundness roughly correspond to "true positive" and "false positive" in classification: completeness requires the adversary to return some nontrivial result when its input M (X) is accurate; soundness guarantees that an individual is unlikely to be identified as IN if the estimator that A P used is independent of the individual. When a tracing adversary satisfies these properties, Theorem 2.1 conveniently leads to a minimax risk lower bound; that is, Theorem 2.1 is a reduction from constructing minimax risk lower bounds to finding complete and sound tracing adversaries.
In the next section, we illustrate this technique by designing a complete and sound tracing adversary for the classical mean estimation problem.
2.3.
A first application: private mean estimation in the classical setting. Consider the d-dimensional sub-Gaussian distribution family P(σ, d), defined as
where µ P = E P [x] ∈ R d is the mean of P , and e k denotes the kth standard basis vector of R d . Following the notation introduced in Section 2.1, X = R d and θ(P ) = µ P . Further we take l(t) = t and ρ(θ, θ ) = θ − θ 2 , so that our risk function is simply the 2 error. The minimax risk is then denoted by
We propose a tracing adversary:
wherex is a fresh independent draw from P . The adversary is indeed complete and sound, as desired:
Intuitively, this adversary is constructed as follows. Without privacy constraints, a natural estimator for µ P is the sample mean M (X) = 1 n n i=1 x i . On one hand, when x does not belong to X = {x i } n i=1 , x −x, M (X) is a sum of d independent zero-mean random variables and we have E[ x − x, M (X) ] = 0. On the other hand, when x belongs to X, we will have
2 ] > 0, and A P (x, M (X)) is more likely to output IN than OUT.
In view of Theorem 2.1,
Combining with the well-known statistical minimax lower bound, see for example, Lehmann and Casella [24] , namely
we arrive at the minimax lower bound result for differentially private mean estimation.
Theorem 2.2. Let M ε,δ denote the collection of all (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithms, and let X = (
Remark 1. In comparison, applying Barber and Duchi [4] 's lower bound argument to our current model yields
Remark 2. The minimax lower bound characterizes the cost of privacy in the mean estimation problem: the cost of privacy dominates the statistical risk when d log(1/δ)/ √ nε 1.
Privacy Cost of High-dimensional Mean Estimation.
In this section and the subsequent Section 4, we consider the high-dimensional setting where d n and the population parameters of interest, such as the mean vector µ P or the regression coefficient β, are sparse. In each statistical problem investigated, we present a minimax risk lower bound with differential privacy constraint, as well as a procedure with differential privacy guarantee that attains the lower bound up to factor(s) of log n.
3.1.
Private high-dimensional mean estimation. We first consider the problem of estimating the sparse mean vector µ P of a d-dimensional subGaussian distribution, where d can possibly be much larger than the sample size n. We denote the parameter space of interest by
where the sparsity level is controlled by the parameter s.
The tracing adversary for this problem is given by
wherex is an independent draw from P , and
Given M (X) computed from a data set X, the tracing adversary attempts to identify whether an individual x belongs to X, by calculating the difference of j x j and jx j over those coordinates j where M (X) has a large value. If x belongs to X, the former should be correlated with M (X) and is likely to be larger than the latter.
Formally, the tracing adversary is complete and sound under appropriate sample size constraint:
In conjunction with our general lower bound result Theorem 2.1, we have
some τ > 0, and
The first term is the statistical minimax lower bound of sparse mean estimation (see, for example, [23] ), and the second term is due to the privacy constraint. Comparing the two terms shows that, in high-dimensional sparse mean estimation, the cost of differential privacy is significant when
In the next section, we present a differentially private procedure that attains this convergence rate up to a logarithmic factor.
3.2.
Rate-optimal procedures. The rate-optimal algorithms in this paper utilize some classical subroutines in the differential privacy literature, such as the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms and reporting the noisy maximum of a vector. Before describing our rate-optimal algorithms in detail, it is helpful to review some relevant results, which will also serve as the building blocks of the differentially private linear regression methods in Section 4.
3.2.1. Basic differentially private procedures. It is frequently the case that differential privacy can be attained by adding properly scaled noises to the output of a non-private algorithm. Among the most prominent examples are the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms.
The Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms. As the name suggests, the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms achieve differential privacy by perturbing an algorithm with Laplace and Gaussian noises respectively. The scale of such noises is determined by the sensitivity of the algorithm:
For algorithms with finite L 1 -sensitivity, the differential privacy guarantee can be attained by adding noises sampled from a Laplace distribution.
Lemma 3.2.1 (The Laplace mechanism [16] ). For any algorithm f mapping a dataset to R d such that ∆ 1 (f ) < ∞, the Laplace mechanism, given by
where
Similarly, adding Gaussian noises to algorithms with finite L 2 -sensitivity guarantees differential privacy. Lemma 3.2.2 (The Gaussian mechanism [16] ). For any algorithm f mapping a dataset to R d such that ∆ 2 (f ) < ∞, the Gaussian mechanism, given by
An important application of these mechanisms is differentially private selection of the maximum/minimum, which also plays a crucial role in our high-dimensional mean estimation algorithm. Next we review some algorithms for differentially private selection, to provide some concrete examples and prepare us for stating the main algorithms.
Differentially private selection. Selecting the maximum (in absolute value) coordinate of f (x) := f (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) ∈ R d is a straightforward application of the Laplace mechanism, as follows:
Return i max = arg max j |f j (x) + ξ j | and f imax (x) + w, where w is an independent draw from Laplace(2B/ε).
In applications, we are often interested in finding the top-k numbers with k > 1. There are two methods for this task: an iterative "Peeling" algorithm that runs the PrivateMax algorithm k times, with appropriately chosen privacy parameters in each iteration.
Algorithm 2: Peeling(f (x), k, B, ε, δ):
Run PrivateMax z, B,
Remove f i j (x) from z. 5: end for 6: Report the k selected pairs.
With these differentially private selection subroutine, we are ready to present the high-dimensional mean estimation algorithm in the next section.
3.2.2.
Differentially-private mean estimation in high dimensions. Let f T (·) denote projection onto the ∞ ball of radius T > 0 in R d , where T is a tuning parameter for the truncation level. With suitably chosen T , the following algorithm attains the minimax lower bound in Theorem 3.1, up to at most a logarithmic factor in n.
Algorithm 3: Private High-dimensional Mean Estimation
Find the topŝ components ofμ T by running Peeling (µ T ,ŝ, 2T /n, ε, δ) and set the remaining components to 0. Denote the resulting vector bŷ
In view of Theorem 3.1, the theorem below shows that the high-dimensional mean estimation algorithm is rate-optimal up to a factor of √ log n.
Algorithm 3 is (ε, δ)-differentially private, and
2. otherwise, with the choice of T ≥ Cσ √ log n for a sufficiently large constant C > 0,
Remark 3. [12] introduced the notion of α-local privacy and shows that high-dimensional estimation is effectively impossible with α-local privacy constraint. In contrast, Theorem 3.2 shows that sparse mean estimation is still possible with (ε, δ)-differential privacy constraint.
Remark 4. The role of the truncation parameter T is to control the sensitivity of the sample mean so that the Laplace/Gaussian mechanisms are applicable. T can be replaced by a differentially-private estimator that consistently estimates the sample's range. Examples of such an estimator can be found in [25] . This remark is applicable to all truncation tuning parameters in algorithms that appear in Sections 3 and 4.
3.2.3. Differentially private algorithms in the classical setting. In the classical setting of d n, the optimal rate of convergence of the mean estimation problem can be achieved simply by a noisy, truncated sample mean: given an i.i.d. sample X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n , the estimator is defined aŝ
where f T (·) denotes projection onto the L ∞ ball of radius T > 0 in R d , and W is an independent draw from N d 0,
The theoretical guarantees for this estimator are summarized in the theorem below.
,μ T is an (ε, δ)-differentially private procedure, and:
By comparing with Theorem 2.2, we see that the noisy truncated sample mean achieves the optimal rate of convergence up to a factor of √ log n.
4. Privacy Cost of Linear Regression. In this section, we investigate the cost of differential privacy in linear regression problems, with primary focus on the high-dimensional setting where d n and the regression coefficient β is assumed to be sparse; the classical, low-dimensional case (d n) will also be covered. Through the general lower bound technique described in Section 2, we are able to establish minimax lower bounds that match the minimax rate of our differentially private procedures up to factor(s) of log n.
4.1.
Lower bound of high-dimensional linear regression. For high-dimensional sparse linear regression, we consider the following distribution space
where the parameter of interest is β = E[x x] −1 E[x y] ∈ R d is defined such that Xβ is the best linear approximation of y, and C is a generic constant. For brevity, we use P to denote P (x, y).
denote an i.i.d. sample drawn from some P ∈ P X,Y (σ, d, s), we propose the tracing adversary
andỹ is a fresh independent sample with covariates x. This adversary satisfies the following properties:
The proof of this lemma, which appears in the supplementary material, includes a novel generalization of the fingerprinting lemma (see [35] , [7] , and [18] ) to Gaussian random variables, which may be of independent interest.
We note that the extra assumption in Lemma 4.1.1 that M (D) − β ∞ < σ/2 can be gained "for free": when it fails to hold, there would be an automatic lower bound that E M (D)
Specifically, the second term in the lower bound is a consequence of Lemma 4.1.1 and Theorem 2.1. The first term is due to the statistical minimax lower bound for high-dimensional linear regression (see, for instance, [30] and [40] ).
4.2.
Upper bound of high-dimensional linear regression. For high-dimensional sparse linear regression, we propose the following differentially private LASSO algorithm, which splits the sample of size n into subsamples of size O(log n) and iterates through the subsamples by a truncated gradient descent with random perturbation. Algorithm 4: Differentially Private LASSO 1: Inputs: privacy parameters δ, ε, deign matrix X,response vector y, step size η, sparsity tuning parameterŝ, truncation tuning parameter T and the number of iterations N 0 .
Initialize the algorithm with anŝ-sparse vectorβ (0) .
denotes projection onto the ∞ ball of radius T > 0 in R d .
6:β (t+1) = Peeling β (t+0.5) ,ŝ, 4T /(n/N 0 ), ε, δ . 7: end for 8: Outputβ :=β (N 0 ) .
s). If we have that
• Σ X , the covariance matrix of x, satisfies 0 < λ max (Σ X )/λ min (Σ X ) < Λ for some constant Λ > 0, • β (0) − β 2 ≤ κ β 2 for some κ ∈ (0, 1), and • the tuning parameters satisfy T ≥ Kσ √ log n for a sufficiently large constant K > 0, N 0 log n,ŝ s and for ρ :=
thenβ is (ε, δ)-differentially private, and it holds with high probability that
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first differentially private LASSO algorithm with parameter estimation consistency guarantees. In addition, in view of Theorem 4.1, we see that the proposed algorithm achieves the optimal convergence rate up to a logarithm term log 3/2 n.
Linear regression in the classical setting.
In the classical linear regression problem, we have i.i.d. observations D = {(x i , y i )} n i=1 drawn from some P that belongs to the distribution space
where the parameter of interest is β = E[x x] −1 E[x y] ∈ R d is defined such that Xβ is the best linear approximation of y, and C is a generic constant.
To apply Theorem 2.1 to deriving the lower bound for the linear regression model, we consider the following tracing adversary:
whereỹ is a fresh independent draw with the same covariates x as y. The next lemma summarizes the soundness and completeness properties of the tracing adversary.
As in the high-dimensional setting, the extra assumption in this lemma that M (D) − β ∞ < σ/2 can be gained "for free".
Our minimax lower bound for private linear regression in the classical setting is presented in the theorem below: Theorem 4.3. Let M ε,δ denote the collection of all (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithms, and suppose that ε = O(1), n −1 e −3εn/2 ≤ δ ≤ n −(1+τ ) for some τ > 0 and
Similar to the other lower bound results, the two terms in this minimax lower bound correspond to the statistical risk and the risk due to privacy constraint respectively. 4.3.1. Differentially private algorithms in the classical setting. In the classical setting of d n, the optimal rate of convergence for differentially private linear regression can be directly achieved by perturbing the OLS estimator with suitably chosen noises.
Letβ =β(X, y) := (X X) −1 X y denote the OLS estimator, we consider the noisy estimatorβ
where f T (·) denotes projection onto the ∞ ball of radius T > 0 in R d , and W is an independent draw from N d 0,
Theorem 4.4. Let (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), · · · , (x n , y n ) be an i.i.d. sample drawn from P (x, y) ∈ P X,Y (σ, d). If we have that
• Σ X , the covariance matrix of x, satisfies 0 < 1/Λ < λ min (Σ X ) ≤ λ max (Σ X ) < Λ for some constant Λ > 0, and • T ≥ Kσ √ log n for a sufficiently large constant K > 0, then with high probability,β T is (ε, δ)-differentially private, and
This risk upper bound shows that the lower bound in Theorem 4.3 is optimal up to a factor of √ log n.
5. Simulation Studies. The proposed private algorithms can be implemented efficiently. In this section, we perform simulation studies of these algorithms to demonstrate the cost of privacy in different statistical estimation schemes, as well as the merits of the proposed algorithms. More specifically, we study the following four different problems. (x 1 , y 1 ) , ..., (x n , y n ) are generated from the model y = Xβ + . In the simulation, the entries of design matrix are independently generated from Bernoulli(0.15), and 1 , ... n is an i.i.d sample from N (0, σ 2 ) with σ = 0.5. The coefficients β is set to β 1 = ... = β d = 1. High-dimensional linear regression The data ( x 1 , y 1 ) , ..., (x n , y n ) are generated from the model y = Xβ+ . In the simulation, we set σ = 0.5 and the design matrix is generated the same way as in the conventional setting. The coefficients β is set to be s-sparse with β 1 = ... = β s = 1, and the rest are set to 0.
Conventional mean estimation
In all simulations, the privacy parameters (ε, δ) take values among (0.5, 0. In these simulation studies, we also compare the performance of (ε, δ)-differentially private methods with the optimal mechanisms under α-local differential privacy proposed in [12] , where we set the local privacy parameter to be α = 10, corresponding to a weak local privacy constraint. As there is no high-dimensional linear regression algorithms with α-local differential privacy in [12] , we compare our algorithm with the locally private (low-dimensoinal) linear regression algorithm proposed in [12] . The locally private linear regression algorithm is implemented with the knowledge of β's support, which is not usually available in applications. Tables 1-4 summarize the estimation errors with respect to 2 error ( μ − µ 2 in mean estimation problems and β − β 2 in regression problems) for various methods. In the tables, NP, DP, LDP stand for the non-private algorithms, differentially private algorithms, and locally differentially private algorithms respectively. Each estimation error reported is the average over 100 replications of a given method; the standard error of each case is reported in parentheses. Our proposed differentially private algorithms outperform their locally private counterparts in [12] , especially in high-dimensional problems. This is expected as [12] shows that it is impossible to construct consistent estimators in the high-dimensional problems with α-local differential privacy constraint. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 As seen in Figure 1 (error in log 10 -scale), the gap in estimation errors between the non-private algorithms and differentially private algorithms diminishes as the sample size n increases.
6. Data Analysis.
SNP array of adults with schizophrenia.
We analyze the SNP array data of adults with schizophrenia, collected by [26] , to illustrate the performance of our high-dimensional sparse mean estimator. In the dataset, there are 387 adults with schizophrenia, 241 of which are labeled as "average IQ" and 146 of which are labeled as "low IQ". The SNP array is obtained by genotyping the subjects with the Affymetrix Genome-Wide Human SNP 6.0 platform. For our analysis, we focus on the 2000 SNPs with the highest minor allele frequencies (MAFs); the full dataset is available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/geo/query/acc.cgi?acc=GSE106818.
Privacy-perserving data analysis is very much relevant for this dataset and genetic data in general, because as [22] demonstrates, an adversary can infer the absence/presence of an individual 's genetic data in a large dataset by cross-referencing summary statistics, such as MAFs, from multiple genetic datasets. As MAFs can be easily calculated from the mean of an SNP array, differentially-private estimators of the mean can effectively allow reporting the MAFs without compromising any individual's privacy.
The data set takes the form of a 387 × 2000 matrix. The entries of the matrix take values 0, 1 or 2, representing the number of minor allele(s) at each SNP, and therefore the MAF of each SNP location in this sample can be obtained by computing the mean of the rows in this matrix. Sparsity is introduced by considering the difference in MAFs of the two IQ groups: the MAFs of the two groups are likely to differ at a small number of SNP locations among the 2000 SNPs considered.
For m ranging from 10 to 120, we subsample m subjects from each of the two IQ groups, say {x 11 , x 12 , · · · x 1m } and {x 21 , x 22 , · · · x 2m }, and apply our sparse mean estimator to {x 11 − x 21 , x 12 − x 22 , · · · x 1m − x 2m } witĥ s = 20 and privacy parameters (ε, δ) = (0.2, n −1.1 ). The error of this estimator is then calculated by comparing with the mean of the entire sample. This procedure is repeated 100 times to obtain Figure 2 , which displays the bootstrap estimate of E[ μ − µ 2 ]/d as m increases from 10 to 120. The performance of the sparse mean estimator in [12] , with privacy parameter α = 10, is also plotted for comparison. cmu.edu/datasets/houses.zip. In this dataset, each subject is a block group in California in the 1990 Census; there are 20640 block groups in this dataset. The response variable is the median house value in the block group; the covariates include the median income, median age, total population, number of households, and the total number of rooms of all houses in the block group. In general, summary statistics such as mean or median do not have any differential privacy guarantees, so the absence of information on individual households in the dataset does not preclude an adversary from extracting sensitive individual information from the summary statistics. Privacy-preserving methods are still desirable in this case.
For m ranging from 100 to 20600, we subsample m subjects from the dataset to compute the differentially private OLS estimate, with privacy parameters (ε, δ) = (0.2, n −1.1 ). The error of this estimator is then calculated by comparing with the non-private OLS estimator computed using the entire sample. This procedure is repeated 100 times to obtain Figure 3 , which displays the trend of the bootstrap estimate of E[ β − β 2 ]/d as m increases from 100 to 20600. The performance of the linear regression method in [12] , with privacy parameter α = 10, is also plotted for comparison. 7. Discussion. In summary, this paper characterizes the tradeoff between statistical accuracy and privacy guarantees, by providing informationtheoretic lower bounds for estimation with differential privacy constraint and differentially private algorithms that has matching upper bounds. For the lower bounds, as standard packing arguments fail to establish sharp results under privacy constraints, we have developed a novel lower bound technique based on tracing adversary. The utility of the new technique is illustrated by establishing minimax lower bounds for differentially private mean estimation and linear regression, in both low-dimensional and high-dimensional settings. We have also proposed computationally efficient algorithms with matching upper bounds up to logarithmic factors.
This line of work can be extended to designing rate-optimal algorithms with (ε, δ)-differential privacy guarantee for a greater variety of statistical problems. For instance, the results in the current paper are applicable to estimation of moment-based statistics, such as mean and covariance matrices estimation. It would also be interesting to generalize the results further to (high-dimensional) empirical risk minimization, (high-dimensional) classification, and nonparametric estimation such as density estimation and nonparametric regression. We are also interested in studying the statistical cost of other notions of privacy, such as concentrated differential privacy [14] and Renyi differential privacy [27] . These notions of privacy have found many applications such as stochastic gradient Langevian dynamics and stochastic Monte Carlo sampling [37] .
In addition, as we deepen our understanding of statistical estimation problems with privacy constraints, the next goal should ideally be uncertainty quantification, i.e. statistical inference, with privacy constraints, which is largely unexplored in the statistics literature. We hope to investigate the rate-optimal length of a confidence interval, and the optimal power in hypothesis testing with the constraint of (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
8. Proofs. In this section, we prove the main results, Theorem 2.1, the general lower bound argument, and Theorem 4.2, the minimax risk upper bound of the private high-dimensional linear regression. For reasons of space, the proofs of other results and technical lemmas are provided in the supplementary material [8] .
8.1. Proof of Theorem 2.1. In this section, we prove Theorem 2.1, the general approach to obtain lower bound with privacy constraint. The applications of Theorem 2.1 to different models to obtain lower bounds are discussed in the supplementary material [8] .
The proof of Theorem 2.1 consists of three steps, as follows.
Step 1: A preliminary lower bound. For every (ε, δ)-differentially private M , the tracing adversary A P (·, M (X)) that post-processes M is (ε, δ)-differentially private as well. It follows that for every i ∈ [n],
Then for T R(X, M (X)) := {i ∈ [n] : A P (x i , M (X)) = IN}, the union bound leads to
This inequality and the completeness property together imply that
We have δ < n −(1+τ ) by assumption, so P(ρ(M (X), θ(P )) λ(P, δ)) ≤ δ + n (e ε + 1) δ is bounded away from 1. Markov's inequality and the monotonicity of l immediately yield a preliminary lower bound for n ψ(P, δ):
Step 2: An improvement by group privacy. In this step, we show that the preliminary lower bound found in Step 1 is valid for n ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε.
Consider the following construction: let k = C log( 1 nδ )/ε and assume that k divides n without the loss of generality. Since 1 n e −3εn/2 ≤ δ < n −(1+τ ) , we have (Cτ /ε) log n < k ≤ n. The value of C is to be specified later.
We first draw an i.i.d. sample of size n/k, denoted byX = {x 1 ,x 2 , · · · ,x n/k }, from P , then sample with replacement fromX for n times to obtain X = {x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n }. For any M ∈ M ε,δ , we define M k (X) ≡ M (X). Because M is (ε, δ)-differentially private, M k is also differentially private, thanks to the following group privacy lemma: Lemma 8.1.1 (group privacy, [33] ). For every m ≥ 1, if M is (ε, δ)-differentially private, then for every pair of datasets X = {x k } k and Z = {z k } k satisfying k 1(x i = z i ) ≤ m, and every event S,
The group privacy lemma means that, to characterize the privacy parameters of M k , it suffices to upper-bound the number of changes in X incurred by replacing one element ofX: let m i denote the number of times that x i appears in a sample of size n drawn with replacement fromX, then our quantity of interest here is simply max i∈[n] m i . We shall analyze max i∈[n] m i under two separate scenarios: (1) . (1 + τ ) log n ≤ log 1 δ ≤ (1 + 2τ ) log n for some τ > 0, and (2). log 1 δ
(1 + τ ) log n for all τ > 0.
(1). (1 + τ ) log n ≤ log 1 δ ≤ (1 + 2τ ) log n: under this setting, we have k = C log( 1 nδ )/ε (Cτ /ε) log n. The analysis makes use of a result from [29] , stated below:
follows a uniform multinomial( ) distribution, and d log d c for some constant c, then for every ζ > 0,
where r c is the unique root of 1 + x(log c − log x + 1) − c = 0 that is strictly greater than c.
We apply the lemma to obtain that, for any ζ > 0,
where r is the unique root of 1 + x(log(Cτ /ε) − log x + 1) − (Cτ /ε) = 0 that is greater than Cτ /ε. To see the existence of such a root, note that f C,τ,ε (x) := 1 + x(log(Cτ /ε) − log x + 1) − (Cτ /ε) is strictly concave and achieves the global maximum value of 1 at x = Cτ /ε.
It follows from Lemma 8.1.1 that, with high probability, M k is an (ε(r + ζ) log n, δe ε(r+ζ) log n )-differentially private algorithm. Then we repeat the lower bound argument in Step 1, the key ingredient of which is showing that
By the union bound,
We claim that this probability is always bounded away from 1, because εr < τ with appropriately chosen C: since f C,τ,ε (τ /ε) = (τ /ε)(1 + log C − C) + 1 and ε = O(1), for every τ > 0 there is a sufficiently small C > 0 such that f C,τ,ε (τ /ε) < 0. Since f C,τ,ε (Cτ /ε) = 1 is the global maximum, we have r < τ /ε, or equivalently εr < τ , as desired.
(2). log 1 δ
(1 + τ ) log n: under this setting, we have k = C log(
Each m i is a sum of n independent Bernoulli(k/n) random variables. We apply Chernoff inequality: since Em i = k, we have
The union bound yields
since k log n. By Lemma 8.1.1, M k is a 3εk/2, δe 3εk/2 -differentially private algorithm with high probability: for every i ∈ [n/k],
It follows that
Choosing k < 2 3 log( 1 2nδ )/ε guarantees that the probability is bounded away from 1.
To summarize, in both settings of δ, we have P T R(X, M k (X)) = ∅ bounded away from 1. A similar argument via Markov's inequality as in Step 1 shows, when n/k ψ(P, δ), equivalently n kψ(P, δ) ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε, we have
Since M k (X) = M (X) by construction, we have extended the range over which the lower bound of E[l(ρ(M (X), θ(P ))] ≥ l(λ(P, δ)) is valid by an extra factor of log(1/δ)/ε.
Step 3: Establishing the lower bound for large n. If n ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε, we can choose 0 < α < 1 such that nα ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε. Consider x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n independently drawn from the mixture distributionP = αPθ+(1−α)P 0 ∈ P, which is assumed to satisfy θ(P ) = θ(αPθ+(1−α)P 0 ) = αθ, by our regularity conditions on P and θ.
We then claim that with high probability,
As ρ is induced by a norm, it must be convex in its first argument: for every λ ∈ [0, 1],
By convexity, Jensen's inequality implies that
αλ(P, δ).
The last inequality follows from the lower bound developed in the previous steps, since card(A) = Θ(nα) ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε. Because nα ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε, we have
Proof of Theorem 4.2.
Proof. First, we introduce some useful notation: for a vector v ∈ R k and a set S ⊆ [k], let trunc(v, S) denote the vector obtained by setting v i = 0 for i ∈ S. We also denote n/N 0 ≡ n 0 for brevity.
Privacy Guarantee: Because of sample splitting, for (x, y) ∈ (X (t) , y (t) ) for some 0 ≤ t ≤ N 0 − 1, it suffices to prove the privacy guarantee for the t-th iteration of the algorithm: any iteration prior to the t-th does not depend on (x, y), while any iteration after the t-th is differentially private by post-processing.
At the t-th iteration, the algorithm first updates the non-sparse estimate of β:
We observe thatβ (t) does not depend on (X (t) , y (t) ), so the Peeling step applied toβ (t+0.5) would be (ε, δ)-differentially private if it can be shown that: for every (X (t) ,ỹ (t) ) obtained by replacing one individual in (X (t) , y (t) ), we have (X (t) f T (X (t)β (t) ) − X (t) f T (y (t) )) − (X (t) f T (X (t)β (t) ) −X (t) f T (ỹ (t) ))
This fact is straightforward to show thanks to the ∞ truncations applied to X (t)β (t) and y (t) . Without the loss of generality, assume that (X (t) ,ỹ (t) ) and (X (t) , y (t) ) differ by (x, y) and (x,ỹ), we calculate:
Then the privacy guarantee is proved by Lemma 3.2.4. Statistical Accuracy: We definē β (t+0.5) =β (t) − η · E X,y 1 n 0 X (t) X (t)β (t) − E X,y 1 n 0 X (t) y (t) , β (t+0.5) =β (t) − η · 1 n 0 X (t) f T (X (t)β (t) ) − X (t) f T (y (t) ) , β (t+1) = trunc(β (t+0.5) ,Ŝ (t+0.5) ), whereŜ (t+0.5) is the index set selected by applying Peeling toβ (t+0.5) . Let β * := E x,y [x x] −1 E x,y [x y] be the true parameter. Throughout our calculations below, we treatβ (t) as a deterministic quantity, because it does not depend on (X (t) , y (t) ) by the design of our algorithm. We have
We shall provide upper bounds for the two terms on the right hand side separately. For β (t+1) −β (t+1) 2 , let W denote the vector of Laplace noises of |Ŝ (t+0.5) | =ŝ dimensions that is generated when the Peeling algorithm outputs the noisy topŝ coordinates ofβ (t+0.5) , we have E β (t+1) −β The next step is bounding β (t+1) − β * 2 . We begin with introducing constants µ = 2λ max (Σ X ), ν = 2λ min (Σ X ), such that: ν/2 · β 1 − β 2 2 ≤ E X,y (β 1 − β 2 ) 1 n X X(β 1 − β 2 ) ≤ µ/2 · β 1 − β 2 2
By invoking standard optimization results for minimizing strongly convex and smooth objective functions, e.g., in Nesterov (2004), for stepsize η = 2/(ν + µ),
Then we use the Lemma 5.1 from [38] . Finally, with t log n (namely n 0 n/ log n), T σ √ log n, (8.2) and (8.4) together imply the desired upper bound. 
Proof.
E β (t+0.5) −β (t+0.5) ∞ = 1 n 0 E E X,y X (t) X (t)β (t) − X (t) y (t) − X (t) f T (X (t)β (t) ) − X (t) f T (y (t) )
The goal is to prove these statements with t replaced by t + 1. To apply Lemma 8.2.2, we shall first verify that its conditions are satisfied. We have, β (t+0.5) − β * 2 ≤ ρ β (t) − β * 2 ≤ ρκ · β * 2 ≤ κ β *
.
The first inequality is due to (8.3) ; the second equality is due to our inductive hypothesis. The condition onŝ in Lemma 8.2.2 is satisfied by our choice of the tuning parameter, while the third condition √ŝ β (t+0.5) −β The last inequality is a consequence of the inductive hypothesis and (8.2).
